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IN THE LAND OF KELO: 
STILL NO MEANINGFUL PROTECTION 




This article analyzes Connecticut's legislative response to 
the Supreme Court's decision in Kelo v. City of New London. 
Following a brief summary of the Kelo case, the article 
describes the municipal economic development statutes in 
effect in 2000 when the New London project was approved and 
how these statutes were changed in response to the popular 
backlash against Kelo. Under newly adopted Conn. Gen. Stat. 
8-193(b )(1 ), eminent domain may not be used to acquire 
property for economic development if its primary purpose is to 
increase local tax revenue. The New London development 
plan in Kelo is put to the new statutory test to see if it would 
protect the affected property owners. The clear conclusion is 
that Connecticut's statutory reform provides no meaningful 
protection for property owners against the use of eminent 
domain for private commercial projects. 
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Business Law, School of 
Business, Quinnipiac University, Connecticut. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Keto v. City of New London, 1 the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that private economic development is a permitted public 
use under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Keto 
arose from the exercise of eminent domain under an economic 
development plan adopted by the City ofNew London, 
Connecticut in November 2000. The City condemned the 
property of Susette Kelo and eight other property owners 
pursuant to its plan for the Fort Trumbull section of the City in 
which property would be transferred to a private developer to 
build a project consisting of a hotel and conference center, 
private residences and office buildings. The purpose was to 
create jobs and increase tax revenues for the City. The use of 
eminent domain for such private economic development was 
explicitly authorized under Connecticut law.2 
The Supreme Court's decision in Kelo created a popular 
backlash against the use of eminent domain for private 
economic development. In response to this national outcry, 
many states have enacted reform measures to limit the power 
of eminent domain. 
This article provides a brief background of the Kelo case 
including a summary of the Supreme Court decision. Its 
primary focus, however, is an analysis of the reform enacted by 
the State of Connecticut in response to Kelo. To determine 
whether the statutory reform provides any meaningful 
protection to property owners, the article also asks the 
fundamental question: If the identical New London 
development plan were adopted today, would the revised 
Connecticut law protect property owners from a compulsory 
purchase of their homes? 
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BACKGROUND 
A. Property Rights 
The legal issue raised in Kelo reflects a clash of two 
bedrock principles- the government's authority to exercise the 
power of eminent domain and the individual 's right to use and 
enjoy his private property. The right of private property is 
among the most revered in the common law tradition. In fact, 
the protection of property rights against government 
interference can be traced as far back as the Magna Carta in the 
thirteenth century.3 The provisions in the U.S. Constitution 
that protect property rights, including the Fifth Amendment, 
reflect the paramount value placed by the Founding Fathers on 
the right to acquire and own property.4 
In 1795, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of 
property rights as follows: "the right of acquiring and 
possessing property and having it protected is one of the 
natural, inherent and inalienable rights of man . . . [T]he 
preservation of property then is a primary object of the social 
compact. "5 
For more than two hundred years, the Supreme Court has 
consistently held that it is unlawful for the government to take 
property from A and give it to B. In the oft-cited case Calder 
v. Bull, Justice Chase wrote: 
An Act of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a 
law) contrary to the great first principles of the 
social compact, cannot be considered a rightful 
exercise of legislative authority .. .. A few 
instances will suffice to explain what I mean ... 
[A] law that takes property from A. and gives it 
to B: It is against all reason and justice, for a 
people to entrust a Legislature with such powers; 
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and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that they 
have done it.6 
B. Eminent Domain 
While the sanctity of property rights is a long-standing 
tradition dating back to early English law, the state's power of 
eminent domain also has a long history. It derives from the 
sovereign's inherent power to acquire private property and 
purportedly dates back to Roman times. 7 
The Fifth Amendment limits the government's power of 
eminent domain by requiring that a taking be for a public use 
and that just compensation be paid to the owner. 8 Similar 
protections are also embodied in state laws. 9 As Justice 
O'Connor stated in her dissenting opinion in Kelo: "The public 
use requirement . . . circumscribes[ s] the very scope of the 
eminent domain power: Government may compel an individual 
to forfeit her property for the public's use, but not for the 
benefit of another private person. This requirement promotes 
fairness as well as security."10 
What then constitutes public use? The interpretation of 
public use has been greatly expanded over the last fifty years. 11 
This issue became the key battleground between the 
individual 's right to possess and use his property and the 
state's competing interest in taking it for the public use. 
It is well-established that eminent domain can properly be 
used to take property which will be owned by the government 
and open to the public (such as for a school or a highway). 12 
Under what circumstances, however, is the exercise of eminent 
domain constitutionally permitted when the property will be 
transferred to a private party? There is no general consensus 
on this issue. 13 It is the constitutionality of this expanded use 
of eminent domain which is at the heart of the Kelo case where 
property was taken for the purpose of transferring it to a 
private party to build a private commercial development. 
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C. New London and Susette Kelo 
That the City ofNew London was in economic decline was 
evidenced by its designation by the State as a distressed 
municipality in 1990. In particular, the City had suffered from 
the closing of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center in 1996 
which resulted in the loss of over 1,500 jobs. In an effort to 
revive the city, the New London Development Corporation 
(NLDC) was reactivated in 1998 and authorized to act as the 
City's development agent. In early 1998, Pfizer Inc., the 
pharmaceutical company, announced that it would build a $300 
million research facility on the New London Mill site 
immediately adjacent to the City's Fort Trumbull waterfront 
district. The project was projected to provide nearly 2,000 
jobs.14 
Following Pfizer's announcement, the NLDC prepared an 
integrated municipal economic development plan for the Fort 
Trumbull area pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes (CGS) 
section 8-189. The development plan encompassed 
approximately 90 acres consisting of 115 privately owned 
properties and the 32 acres of land formerly occupied by the 
naval facility. The plan included a waterfront conference hotel, 
a 90,000 square foot research and development facility, new 
houses, office, retail space, and other commercial uses. 15 
The plan's purpose was to complement the new Pfizer 
project, create jobs, increase tax revenues, encourage public 
access to the city's waterfront and eventually build momentum 
for the revitalization of the rest of the City including its 
downtown area. The plan was also designed to make the City 
generally more attractive and provide leisure and recreational 
opportunities on the waterfront and in the park. 16 
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The plan required the acquisition of the 90-acre project 
area by the City and its subsequent transfer to a private 
who would be responsible for developing the property. 1 The 
plan was approved by the New London City Council in January 
2000 and the NLDC was authorized to purchase the property or 
acquire it using eminent domain. The NLDC was able to 
negotiate the purchase of most of the property in the project 
area but it was unable to purchase fifteen parcels. Nine owners 
refused to sell their properties to the City. The NLDC 
exercised its power of eminent domain on behalf of New 
London to condemn these properties. 18 
These fifteen properties in the Fort Trumbull neighborhood 
were not blighted. There is no claim that they were in poor 
condition. They were condemned solely because they were 
located within the area of the development plan adopted by 
New London. 19 
Susette Kelo and the eight other affected property owners 
filed suit against the City of New London challenging the 
condemnation of their properties. They argued that the takings 
did not constitute a public use and were therefore invalid under 
the Constitution of the State ofConnecticur0 and the U.S. 
Constitution.21 New London argued that the taking of non-
blighted property to transfer it to a private developer for the 
purpose of private economic development which was intended 
to increase tax revenues and create jobs was a public use and, 
therefore, a constitutionally permitted taking. 
The case was appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court 
which rejected the homeowners' arguments. The court held 
that an economic development plan that the City had rationally 
determined would promote significant municipal economic 
development constituted a valid public use, thus permitting the 
exercise of eminent domain under both the federal and state 
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constitutions?2 The homeowners appealed to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
THE SUPREME COURT DECISION 
In addressing the issues raised in Kelo, the Supreme Court 
pointed out two polar propositions at the heart of the case. 23 
First, the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole 
purpose of transferring it to another private party Beven 
though compensation is paid to A. However, the State may 
transfer property from one private party to another if the 
purpose is public use such as condemnation for a railroad with 
common-carrier duties. 24 The Court traced the history of its 
interpretation of public use concluding that, having rejected a 
literal requirement that condemned property be put into use for 
the general public, it had adopted instead a broader 
interpretation of public use as public purpose.25 
The issue in Kelo was whether the New London plan 
served a public purpose. In making this determination, the 
Court afforded substantial deference to the legislature's 
determination of what public needs justify the use of the 
takings power. 26 
The Kelo decision relied heavily on Berman v. Parker,27 a 
case which affirmed the exercise of eminent domain to 
transform a blighted area of Washington D.C. into a well-
balanced community through redevelopment. 28 In addition, the 
Court relied on Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff29 which 
upheld the compulsory transfer of fee title from property 
owners to their tenants in order to reduce the concentration of 
land ownership in Hawaii. 30 Relying on the reasoning of both 
these cases, the Court stated: "It would be incongruous to hold 
that the City's interest in the economic benefits to be derived 
from the development of the Fort Trumbull area has less of a 
public character than any of those other interests. Clearly, 
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there is no basis for exempting economic development from 
our traditionally broad understanding of public purpose.''3 ' 
In upholding the constitutionality of the takings in Kelo, the 
Court concluded that the comprehensive development that New 
London believed would provide new jobs, increase tax 
revenues and provide other appreciable benefits to the 
community satisfied the public use requirement of the Fifth 
Amendment. 32 
In its majority opinion, the Supreme Court noted that 
property owners can tum to their own state governments to 
obtain more stringent restrictions on the exercise of the taking 
power. 33 In direct response to Kelo, many states did enact 
legislation to limit the power of eminent domain. 
CONNECTICUT'S LEGISLATIVE REFORM 
By January 1, 2008, thirty-nine states had enacted 
legislation or passed ballot measures in response to Kelo.34 
Many polls taken following the Kelo ruling reflect an 
overwhelming negative response to the use of eminent domain 
for private economic development. 35 In Connecticut, a 2005 
Quinnipiac University poll showed that 88% of the poll 
participants disagreed with the use of eminent domain for 
private economic development. 36 The Connecticut lefislature 
adopted its own post-Kelo reform measures in 2007.3 
A. Reform to Connecticut Municipal Economic Development 
Statutes 
The policy underlying municipal economic development in 
Connecticut is to promote the growth of industry and business 
by helping cities acquire and improve property. Cities are 
authorized to acquire property for industrial and business 
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purposes and, under certain circumstances, to obtain state funds 
for development projects all of which are identified as public 
uses and purposes. 38 
The statutes governing municipal economic development in 
effect in 2000 provided a detailed framework for a plan's 
contents,39 a public hearing process,40 and a plan's adoption by 
the city council. 41 Upon approval of a plan, the development 
agency is authorized to acquire the real estate in the project 
area but, if eminent domain will be used to acquire property, 
the agency must obtain the prior approval of the city council.42 
The agency is specifically authorized to transfer property in the 
project area to private parties provided such transfer is at fair 
market value.4 This statutory scheme was in effect in 2000 
and remains in effect today subject to the recent reform 
measures discussed below. 
In 2007, the Connecticut legislature enacted revisions to 
the statutes governing municipal economic development 
projects (such as the one in New London) as well as to the 
statutes governing municipal blight eradication projects. 
1. Adoption of Primary Purpose Test. 
The recently adopted reform measures impose a limitation 
on the government's power to condemn non-blighted property 
for economic development. Under newly-adopted CGS section 
8-193(b)(l), eminent domain may not be used to acquire 
property for an economic development project if its primary 
purpose is to increase local tax revenue. 44 
In addition, under new statutory provisions, a development 
plan must contain: 
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• A description of the public benefits of the project including 
the estimated property tax benefits, its intended role in 
increasing or sustaining market value of land in the 
municipality and in maintaining or enhancing the 
competitiveness of the municipality;45 and 
• A finding that the public benefits of the plan outweigh any 
private benefits, that the use of eminent domain is 
reasonably necessary, and that the plan is not for the 
primary purpose of increasing tax revenues.46 
Cities are authorized under this statutory framework to 
adopt and implement a plan to develop non-blighted property. 
This includes the right to acquire such property by eminent 
domain and transfer it to private persons for development in 
accordance with the approved plan. The only new substantive 
limitation on this authority is that the proposed project may not 
be 'for the primary purpose of increasing local tax revenue.' 
In addition, the newly-enacted statute requires the 
development agency and the municipal legislative body to 
make a finding that the public benefits outweigh any private 
benefits and identifies additional project goals which constitute 
public benefits. These new goals include: (i) increasing or 
sustaining market value in the municipality; and 
(ii) the competitiveness of the 
muniCipality. It IS mterestmg to note that the legislature 
specifically added property tax benefits as a public benefit,48 a 
project goal that was not previously made explicit. 
Therefore, under the post-Kelo reform measures, increasing 
local tax revenues may not be the primary purpose of a project, 
but the goal of increasing tax revenues is explicitly authorized 
as a permitted purpose. In other words, a goal to increase local 
(property) taxes by a private economic development project 
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will satisfy the legislative requirements so long as it not the 
primary goal. A project will meet the new statutory test if its 
primary purpose, for example, is to increase or sustain market 
value in the municipality or to maintain or enhance the 
competitiveness of the municipality (both ofwhich criteria 
have been added as permitted goals). The goal of increasing 
tax revenues is now explicitly permitted as long as it is not first 
on the list of project goals. 
2. Analysis of Legislative Reform in Municipal Economic 
Development. 
Does recent reform to the statutes governing municipal 
economic development provide any meaningful protection to 
Connecticut property owners? If the same plan at the heart of 
Kelo were adopted today and a challenge brought by the New 
London homeowners to the use of eminent domain, would their 
homes be protected? The validity of the plan would be based 
entirely on its compliance with the revised statutes. 
In the wake of changes made to the governing statutes, the 
City need only show that increasing tax revenues is not the 
primary goal of the project. In the statement of project goals 
contained in the 2000 development plan, increased tax revenue 
is listed as only one of the project goals. 49 If creating jobs were 
the primary goal of the project, then it satisfies the revised 
statutory requirements and the use of eminent domain is 
authorized. If building momentum for the revitalization of 
downtown New London were the project's primary goal, then 
it satisfies the newly revised statutes and the use of eminent 
domain is authorized. Moreover, the stated project goal of 
revitalizing downtown New London falls squarely within the 
new statutory criterion of 'enhancing the competitiveness of 
the municipality.' In light of the new statutory limitation on 
the use of eminent domain for economic development, New 
London might simply omit 'increased tax revenue' from its list 
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of project goals if it were adopting such a plan today. But, 
assuming this was a project goal, placing it anywhere but first 
on the list would satisfy the new statutory limitation. 
It is clear that the New London development plan would be 
authorized under the newly-revised statutes. If these statutory 
revisions were in effect in the year 2000, the property of 
Susette Kelo and the eight other homeowners in Fort Trumbull, 
would not be any safer from seizure by the government. The 
'primary purpose' test adds no meaningful protection to 
Connecticut property owners. The measures adopted by the 
Connecticut legislature in response to Kelo provide no 
substantive protection limiting the government's authority to 
exercise eminent domain for the purpose of private economic 
development. 5° Indeed, it seems unlikely that anyone but the 
'stupid staffer' 51 would fail to satisfy the statutory requirements 
governing a taking for private economic development in the 
State of Connecticut today. Connecticut property owners have 
no more substantive protection against government seizure of 
their property for private economic development today than 
they did in 2000. 
In addition to condemnations for economic development 
projects, municiP:alities are authorized to condemn property to 
eradicate blight. 2 The New London plan in Kelo did not 
involve blighted properties and was not undertaken pursuant to 
the blight eradication statutory provisions. However, as part of 
its post-Kelo legislative reform, the Connecticut legislature also 
enacted revisions to the blight eradication statutes. 
B. Reform to Connecticut Blight Removal Statutes 
The statutes governing blight removal have been revised to 
prohibit the acquisition of property by eminent domain for a 
blight removal project for the primary purpose of increasing 
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tax revenue. 53 For the reasons discussed above regarding the 
new primary purpose test in economic development projects, 
this reform provides no substantive protection to property 
owners. By its very nature of blight removal, the project's 
primary goal will undoubtedly be - removal of blight. Even if 
increased tax revenue is a stated project goal, this would in all 
likelihood be reflected as a non-primary goal. 
Adding the primary purpose test as a limitation on eminent 
domain takings under both economic development and blight 
removal projects provides no meaningful protection to property 
owners. However, the expanded definition of blight recently 
enacted by the Connecticut legislature has the potential to 
expand a city's power of eminent domain substantially. 
1. Broad Blight Definition. 
The long-standing public policy of the statutes governing 
blight eradication in Connecticut is redevelopment of blighted 
areas. Municipalities are specifically authorized to use eminent 
domain to acquire properties within a blight redevelopment 
area with approval ofthe city's legislative body. 54 Properties 
which are unsafe, unsanitary or otherwise substandard are 
deemed blighted under the statute. In addition, property that is 
deteriorated or deteriorating is considered blighted. 55 
Prior to recent legislative reform, there was no statutory 
definition of 'deteriorated' or 'deteriorating' in the governing 
statutes. Now these terms are defined in revised CGS section 
8-125 to include factors such as unsafe plumbing, heating and 
electrical facilities and unsafe streets. More importantly, under 
the new statute, an area is considered deteriorated or 
deteriorating if at least twenty percent of the buildings in the 
area contain defects that warrant clearance. These defects 
include improper location of structures, obsolete building types 
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and detrimental land uses.56 This new statutory provision re-
defining blight greatly expands the government's eminent 
domain power in Connecticut. 
2. Analysis of Legislative Reform in Blight Removal Projects. 
Connecticut cities have long had the power to use eminent 
domain to acquire property in blighted areas for redevelop-
ment. 57 Under the new statutory definition, an area can be 
designated as blighted if twenty percent of the properties meet 
the nebulous condition of deteriorated property or the even 
more nebulous condition of deteriorating property. A 
neighborhood will be considered blighted even though eighty 
percent of the properties are well maintained. It has been 
suggested that, under this type of broad definition of blight, 
some of the country's most exclusive neighborhoods, such as 
Beacon Hill and Greenwich Village, could be considered 
blighted. 58 
It is not unusual for a city to sponsor private economic 
development under the statutory framework of blight 
eradication. Including such vague criteria as detrimental land 
use in defining blight makes it even easier for a city to use 
eminent domain for private commercial projects. Using a 
broad definition ofblight, Times Square was declared blighted 
in the 1980's which paved the way for the City ofNew York to 
use eminent domain to acquire property for a commercial 
project including a new headquarters for the New York Times, 
additional office space, condominiums, and retail space. 59 A 
large portion of downtown Las Vegas was declared blighted 
under a broad blight definition with the result that private 
property was taken for the purpose of building a parking 
to be operated by, and for the benefit of, a casino consortium. 0 
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Similarly, private property is subject to taking under the 
recently-expanded eminent domain authority governing blight 
removal in Connecticut. Property owners achieved no 
protection by the legislature's adoption of this expansive 
definition of deteriorated or deteriorating properties. In fact, 
this reform likely results in a further erosion of property rights 
in the state. 
REFORM IN OTHER STATES 
Many states have enacted meaningful limitations on the use 
of eminent domain to protect property owners.61 The Florida 
legislature enacted reforms which effectively abolish the use of 
eminent domain for private economic development. 62 In 
addition, Florida citizens passed a referendum to amend the 
state constitution so that enactment of any law that allows the 
transfer to a private party of any private property taken by 
eminent domain would require a three-fifths supermajority vote 
of the state legislature. 63 
Nevada has also enacted strong limitations on the use of 
eminent domain. Projects that transfer the property to a private 
person/entity are specifically excluded from permitted public 
uses. Limited exceptions in the legislation permit transfer to a 
private entity for such uses as utilities, railroads, airports or to 
abate an immediate threat to public safety.64 
State Supreme Courts have also recently addressed the 
constitutionality of condemnation for private economic 
development interpreting their own state constitutions. Shortly 
after the Connecticut Supreme Court decided Kelo, the 
Michigan Supreme Court decided Wayne v. Hathcock.65 The 
project in Hathcock provided for construction of a conference 
center, hotel and a recreational facility with private property to 
be condemned and transferred to private parties. The project 
2009/In the Land of Kelo/82 
was estimated to create 30,000 jobs and $350 million in tax 
revenues. The Michigan Supreme Court held that the taking 
violated the public use limitation contained in the Michigan 
State Constitution and explicitly overruled the state's landmark 
Poletown decision, effectively prohibiting the use of eminent 
domain for private economic development. 66 
The Michigan legislature subsequently endorsed Hathcock 
by adopting Joint Resolution E proposing an amendment to the 
Michigan State Constitution that provides: "'Public Use' does 
not include the taking of private property for transfer to a 
private entity for the purpose of economic development or 
enhancement of tax revenues."67 The Supreme Courts of 
Ohio68 and Oklahoma69 have also recently held that takings for 
private economic development are unconstitutional under their 
state constitutions. 
In addition, many states have addressed the issue of blight 
removal projects in response to Keto (even though Keto did not 
deal with blight removal). For instance, under revisions 
adopted by the Ohio legislature, a "blighted area" is now 
defined as "an area in which at least seventy percent of the 
parcels are blighted parcels."7° Florida prohibits the 
use of eminent domain for blight removal. 1 If the 
Connecticut legislature intended to restrict the power of 
eminent domain for economic development or blight projects, 
there are many ways this could have been accomplished. 
CONCLUSION 
In the wake of Keto, Connecticut enacted revisions to its 
statutes governing both municipal economic development and 
blight removal. These reform measures may at first glance 
appear to provide protection to property owners in the state. 
However, an examination ofthe substance of the state's reform 
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measures reveals that the legislature has provided no 
substantive limitation on the state's power of eminent domain. 
In fact, in the area of blight condemnation, the state's eminent 
domain power may well have been expanded. In the area of 
takings for private economic development, Connecticut 
legislative reform provides no meaningful protection to 
property owners. 
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between $680,000 and $1.249,843 in annual property tax revenues for the City. Kelo, 843 A.2d atSIO. 
17 At the time of the trial in the Connecticut Superior Court, the NLDC was negotiating with Corcoran Jennison, a 
private developer. to enter into a ninety-nine year ground lease of property designated as parcels I, 2, and 3 in the 
development plan for a rental fee of one dollar per year. /d. at 5 I 0. 
18/d.at511. 
19 Susette Kelo had made extensive improvements to her house. Another property owner. Wilhelmina Dery. was 
born in her Fort Trumbull home in 1918 and had lived there her whole life. Kelo, 545 U.S. at475. 
20 CoNN. CONST. art. I, § II ("The property of no person shall be taken for public use. without just compensation 
therefor."). Note that the court did not separately address the state constitutional argument because the plaintiffs did 
not assert that the Connecticut state constitution's public use clause offered them any greater protection than that of 
the federal constitution. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 522 n.29. 
21 The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides in relevant part: "No person shall be .. . deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation." The Fifth Amendment's public use restriction has been made applicable to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403,417 (1896); Chi. 
Burlington & Quincy Rd. Co. v Chicago, 166 U.S. 226. 236 (1897). 
22. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 528. At the Connecticut Supreme Court, Kelo was a 4-3 decision. Justice Zarella's dissent 
takes the position that private economic development projects do not constitute public use in the absence of clear and 
convincing evidence that the property will actually be developed to achieve a public purpose. /d. at 600-601 
(Zarella, J., dissenting). Note also that in upholding the constitutionality of the takings in New London, the court 
specifically singled out the case of Pole/own Neighborhood Council v. Detroit. /d. at 528 (majority opinion) (citing 
Poletown, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981)). Poletown is a landmark case which upheld, under the Michigan State 
Constitution, the taking of private homes for the construction of a major car manufacturing assembly plant in Detroit. 
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Shortly after the Connecticut Supreme Court released its decision in Kelo, however, Poletown was ovenurned by the 
Michigan Supreme Court in Wayne v. Hathcock. 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). See infra note 66. 
23 Kelo, 545 U.S. at477. 
24/d 
25 See id at479-80 (quoting. in part, Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984). ("[T)his 'Court long ago 
rejected any literal requirement that condemned property be put into use for the general public.' Indeed, while many 
state courts in the mid-19th century endorsed 'use by the public' as the proper definition of public use, that narrow 
view steadily eroded over time. Not only was the 'use by the public' test difficult to administer (e.g .. what proportion 
of the public need have access to the property? at what price?), but it proved to be impractical given the diverse and 
always evolving needs of society. Accordingly, when this Court began applying the Fifth Amendment to the States at 
the close of the 19th century, it embraced the broader and more natural interpretation of public use as 'public 
purpose.'" (internal citations omitted)). 
26 See id at488 (Quoting. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242-43) ("When the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its 
means are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of takings- no less than 
debates over the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation-are not to be carried out in the federal 
courts."). 
27 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). In Bemwn, the Court upheld a redevelopment plan for a blighted area of 
Washington, D.C. Under the plan_ the area would be condemned and part of it utilized for the construction of 
streets, schools, and other public faciliti<S. The remainder of the land would be leased or sold to private parties for 
the purpose of redevelopment, including the construction of low-cost housing. The owner of a department store 
located in the area challenged the condemnation, arguing that his store was not itself bl ighted and that the creation of 
a "better balanced, more attractive community" was not a valid public use. The Court rejected his constitutional 
argument and unanimously held that the taking was a public use. 
28 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480-81. 
29 Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (holding that the abolition of a land oligopoly was a public benefit). 
30 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 481-82. 
31 /d. at 485. 
32 Chief Justice Rehnquist. and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas dissented vigorously from the majority 
opinion. See id. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("To reason. as the Court does, that the incidental public benefits 
resulting from the subsequent ordinary use of private property render economic development takings ' for public use' 
is to wash out any distinction between private and public use of property."); see also id. at 506 (Thomas, J.. 
dissenting) ("If such 'economic development' takings are for a ' public use,' any taking is, and the Court has erased 
the Public Use Clause from our Constitution .... "). Justice O'Connor also memorably reiterated her concern 
expressed at oral argument, asserting "[n]othing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-
Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory." /d. at 503 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
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33/d. at 489 ("'We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing funher restrictions on its 
exercise of the takings power. Indeed, many States already impose 'public use' requirements that are stricter than the 
federal baseline. Some of these requirements have been established as a matter of state constitutional law, while 
others are expressed in state eminent domain statutes that carefully limit the grounds upon which takings may be 
exercised. As the submissions of the parties and their amici make clear. the necessity and wisdom of using eminent 
domain to promote economic development are cenainly matters of legitimate public debate."). 
34 For an extensive summary of legislative refonn and other initiatives adopted by states in response to Kelo, see the 
website of the National Conference of State Legislatures at http://www.ncsl.org. See also 
http://www.castlecoalition.org; http://www.ij.org. 
35 See, e.g., Press Release, Castle Coalition, Polls Remain Clear, Public Opposes Eminent Domain Abuse, (Mar. 27, 
2006), available at http://www.castlecoalition.org/ index.php?option-com_content&taSk- view&id• 260 (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2008). 
36 Quinnipiac University Poll. July 19-25, 2005, Quinnipiac University Polling Institute, available at 
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/ xl296.xmi?ReleaseiD• 821 (last visited Nov. 13, 2008). 
37 Conn. Pub. Act 07-141 (adopted June 25, 2007) and Conn. Pub. Act 07-207 (adopted July 10. 2007). The 
Connecticut legislature had earlier responded to the Kelo U.S. Supreme Court case in 2006 by creating an Office of 
Ombudsman for Property Rights. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-50 et seq. (West Supp. 2008). See infra note 50. 
38 CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 8-186 (West 2001). (Note, this statute has not been modified since the Kelo case.) ("It 
is found and declar<d that the economic welfare of the state depends upon the continued growth of industry and 
business within the state; ... [the acquisition and improvement of property) often cannot be accomplished through 
the ordinary operations of private enterprise at competitive rates of progress and economies of cost; that penniuing 
and assisting municipalities to acquire [property) . . . are public uses and purposes for which public moneys may be 
expended ..• . ")(The statutes governing economic development are compiled in Chapter 132 of the Connecticut 
General Statutes.). 
39 CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 8-189 (West 2001). (Included in the detailed requirements of the project plan are "a 
Statement of the number of jobs which the development agency anticipates would be created by the project .. . ," a 
finding that the property will be used "principally for industrial or business purposes,'' and a finding that ''the project 
will contribute to the economic welfare of the municipality and the state .... ") (This statute was subsequently 
amended by Conn. Pub. Act 07-141 § 10 which added to the required contents of a development plan but did not 
delete .any of the plan requirements in effect under prior law. See infra note 45.). 
40 CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 8-19l(a) (West 2001). (Minor changes were made to this statute by Conn. Pub. Act 07-
141 § II .). 
41/d. 
42 CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-193(a)(West 2001 ). (This statute was subsequently amended by Conn. Pub. Act 07-
141 § I. See i'lfra note 50.). 
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43 ld 
44 Conn. Pub. Act 07-141 § I (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 8-193(bXI) (West Supp. 2008)) ("[N)o real 
property may be acquired by eminent domain pursuant to this subsection for the primary purpose of increasing local 
tax revenue."). See also Conn. Pub. Act 07-141 § 10 (codified at CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 8-189(aX14XD)(West 
Supp. 2008). 
45 Conn. Pub. Act 07-141 § 10 (codified at CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-189(a) (West Supp. 2008)) ("The 
project plan shall meet an identified public need and include ... (12) a description of the public benefits 
of the project including, but not limited to ... (B) the estimated property tax benefits; . . . (G) a general 
description of the project's intended role in increasing or sustaining market value of land in the 
municipality; (H) a general description of the project's intended role in assisting residents of the 
municipality to improve their standard of living; and (I) a general statement of the project's role in 
maintaining or enhancing the competitiveness of the municipality; . . . [and ) (14) a preliminary statement 
describing the proposed process for acquiring each parcel of real property, including findings that (A) 
public benefits resulting from the development plan will outweigh any private benefits; (B) existing use 
of the real property carmot be feasibly integrated into the overall development plan for the project; (C) 
aequisition by eminent domain is reasonably necessary to successfully achieve tbe objectives of such 
development plan; and (D) the develop- ment plan is not for the primary purpose of increasing local tax 




49 See Keto v. City of New l<lndon, 545 U.S. 469, 474 (2005). (The development plan. as approved by the City of 
New l<lndon. reflected the goals of the project as creating jobs, generating tax revenue, and helping to build 
momentum for the revitalization of downtown New l<lndon.). 
50 Note that other statutory changes were made to Chapter 132 (governing municipal economic development) but 
they do not provide any mt:aningful restriction on the municipality's power to exercise eminent domain. See Conn. 
Pub. Act 07-141 § I (codified at CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-193 (West Supp. 2008)(affording a property owner a 
right of first refusal to purchase his property if it will not be used for its intended purpose or some other public use; 
imposing a ten-year time limitation on the exercise of eminent domain after the first property in the development area 
is acquired; and a requirement for a public hearing to use eminent domain for an economic development project and 
approval by two-thirds of the legislative body). See also Conn. Pub. Act 07-141 § 8 (codified at CoNN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 8-129(aX2) (West Supp. 2008) (compensation payable for property taken for economic development is 
increased to 125% (or 1500/o under cenain circumstances) of its appraised value.). In addition, the Connecticut 
Legislature in 2006 created the Office of the Ombudsman for Property Rights. The duties imposed on the 
Ombudsman include: providing assistance regarding eminent domain procedures to public agencies and private 
property owners, identifying governmental actions that have potential eminent domain implications, providing 
information to citizens about eminent domain law and their rights, and recommending changes that the Ombudsman 
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thinks should be made to the state's eminent domain law. The Office of Ombudsman for Property Rights is governed 
by CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-50 et seq. (West Supp. 2008). 
51 See generally Kelo, 545 U.S. at 502 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003, 1025-26 n.12 (1992)) ("[1]t is difficult to envision anyooe but the "stupid stafT[er]" failing it."). 
52 CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-124 et seq. (West Supp. 2008). (The statutes governing blight eradication are 
compiled in Chapter 130 of the Connecticut General Statutes.). 
53 Conn. Pub. Act 07-141 § 2 (codified at CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-127a (West Supp. 2008). ("No real property 
may be acquired by a redevelopment agency by eminent domain pursuant to section 8-128 under a redevelopment 
plan under this chapter for the primary purpose of increasing local tax revenue.") Note that other statutory changes 
were made to the statutes governing blight removal but they do not provide any meaningful restriction on a 
municipality's power to exercise eminent domain. There is now a requirement that the public benefits outweigh any 
private benefits from the project; the current use of the property cannot be feasibly integrated into the project plan; 
and the taking is reasonably necessary to achieve the plan's objectives./d. Other refonns include: imposing a ten 
year time limitation on the exercise of eminent domain after the first property is acquired under the plan; and 
affording a property owner a right of first refusal to purchase his property if it will not be used for its intended 
purpose or some other public use. !d. In addition, compensation payable is increased to 125% of appraised value 
under certain circumstances. Conn. Pub. Act 07-141 § 8 (codified at CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-129(aX2) (West 
Supp. 2008)). 
54 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-128(a) (West Supp. 2008). This section is unchanged by recent refonn but has been 
re-numbered. 
55 CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-125(2) (West Supp. 2008). For purposes of the blight removal statutes, a 
redevelopment area means one that is "deteriorated, deteriorating. substandard or detrimental to the safety, health, 
morals or welfare of the community .. .. and may include structures not in themselves substandard or insanitary 
which are found to be essential to complete an adequate unit of development, if the redevelopment area is 
deteriorated. deteriorating. substandard or detrimental to the safety, health. morals or welfare of the community." 
This section is unchanged by recent reform but has been re-numbered. 
56 Conn. Pub. Act 07-207 § I (codified at CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-125(7) (West Supp. 2008) ("'Deteriorated ' 
or 'deteriorating· with respect 10 a redevelopment area means an area wi1hin which at least twenty per cent of the 
buildings contain one or more building deficiencies or environmental deficiencies. including, but not limited to: (A) 
Defects that warrant clearance; (B) conditions from a defect that are not correctable by normal maintenance; (C) 
extensive minor defects that coJiectively have a negative effect on the surrounding area; (D) inadequate original 
construction or subsequent alterations; (E) inadequate or unsafe plumbing. heating or electrical facilities; (F) 
overcrowding or improper location of structures on land; (G) excessive density of dwelling units; (H) conversion of 
incompatible types of uses. such as conversion of a structure located near family dwelling units to rooming 
(I) obsolete building types, such as large residences or other buildings which because of lack of use or maintenance 
have a blighting influence; (J) detrimental land uses or conditions, such as incompatible uses, structures in mixed 
use. or adverse influences from noise. smoke or fumes: (K) unsafe, congested, poorly designed, or otherwise 
89/Vol.22/North East Journal of Legal Studies 
deficient streets; (L) inadequate public utilities or community faci lities that contribute to unsatisfactory living 
conditions or economic decline; or (M) other equally significant building deficiencies or environmental 
deficiencies."). 
57 CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-128 (West 2001). 
58 Norwood v. Homey, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1144 n.13, 1145-46 (Ohio 2006). The Norwood Court overturned the 
taking of homeowners' property based on a local ordinance defining blight to include a "deteriorating" area. The 
Court held the tenn deteriorating area to be unconstitutionally void for vagueness and offending due process rights: 
" In essence, 'deteriorating area' is a standardless standard." /d. at 1145-46. See also infra note 68. 
591n re W. 41st St. Realty v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 744 N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002). 
60 City of Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.Jd I (Nev. 2003). 
6 1 See supra note 34. 
62 FLA. STAT. § 73.013 (enacted by HB 1567 effective May II, 2006) (providing in part: "( I) Notwithstanding any 
other provision of law ... ownership or control of property acquired pursuant to [an eminent domain] petition may 
not be conveyed by the condemning authority or any other entity to a natural person or private entity, by lease or 
otherwise, except that ownership or control of property acquired pursuant to such petition may be conveyed, by lease 
or otherwise, to a natural person or private entity [for common carrier services, public transportation, public 
infrastructure]."). 
63 Florida legislative referendum passed by 69"/o vote in 2006. See Nat' I Conference of State Legislatures, 
http://www.ncsl.orglncsldb/elect98/irsrch.cfm?recid=2775 (last visited Nov. 13, 2008). 
64 Nevada Assembly Bill No. 102, § 4 amending NEV. REv. STAT. § 37.010 (adopted May 23, 2007) (This bill 
provides in pan: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law and except as otherwise provided in this subsection, 
the public uses for which private property may be taken by the exercise of em.inent domain do not include the direct 
or indirect transfer of any interest in the property to another person or entity . . . • " Transfers to a private party are 
pennitted in limited circumstances including use for a utility, railroad, airport and the like, and a taking required to 
abate an immediate threat to the safety of the public or remediate hazardous waste. The Nevada Legislature also 
adopted in Assembly Joint Resolution 3 a proposed amendment to the Nevada Constitution incorporating the 
provisions of Assembly Bill No. 102.). 
65 Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). 
66/d. at 787 (explicitly overruling Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N. W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981). In 
Pole/own, the Michigan court held constitutional the condemnation of private residen tial properties for transfer to a 
private corporation for the construction of a General Motors assembly plant in Detroit which was intended to add 
jobs and taxes to both the city and state. 
67 Joint Resolution E adopted by Michigan Legislature on December 13, 2005. 
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68 Norwood v. Homey. 853 N.E. 2d 111 5 (Ohio 2006). In addition to holding the definition of deteriorated and 
deteriorating areas to be void for vagueness, Norwood held that providing an economic benefit to the City, standing 
alone, does not satisfy the public use requirement of the Ohio State Constitution. In Norwood, the City condemned 
property in an area that it determined to be "deteriorating" to transfer it to a private developer for construction of 
apartments. condominiums, office space, retail space, and City-owned parking garages. The City estimated the 
project would result in nearly S2 million in annual revenues for it. The Norwood court cited with approval the 
analysis of Hathcock, the dissenting opinions of the Supreme Court Justices in Kelo, and the dissenting opinions of 
the Connecticut justices in Ke/o. /d. at 1140-41. See supra note 58. 
69 Muskogee County v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639 (Okla. 2006); see also id. at 650-51 ("[W)e hold that economic 
development alone does not constitute a public purpose and therefore does not constitutionally justify the County's 
exereise of eminent domain .... [W]e view the transfer of property from one private party to another in furtherance 
of potential economic development or enhancement of a community in the absence of blight as a purpose, which 
must yield to our greater constitutional obligation to protect and preserve the individual fundamental interest of 
private property ownership."). 
70 OHIO REv. CoDE ANN.§ 1.08(AX2007). Contrast this with Connecticut's defmition of blight as an area within 
which at least twenty pereent of the buildings are deficient. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-125(7) (West Supp. 2008) 
(adopted by Conn. Pub. Act 07-207 § 1). 
71 FLA. STAT. § 73.014(2)(enacted by HB 1567 effective May II, 2006) (providing in part: "Notwithstanding any 
other provision of law ... the state . .. may not exercise the power of eminent domain for the purpose of preventing 
or eliminating slum or blight conditions .... "). 
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KNUDSEN v. LAX: RESCISSION OF A LEASE 
AGREEMENT WHEN A SEX OFFENDER MOVES NEXT 
DOOR 
by 
Sharlene A. McEvoy* 
ABSTRACT 
When a registered sex offender moves next door, does a tenant 
have a right to terminate a lease for violation of the covenant of 
quiet enjoyment? 
INTRODUCTION 
Sometimes a Small Claims Court case can lead to a 
decision with important implications for landlords and tenants 
among others. Knudsen v. Lax1 which dealt with the issue of 
whether or not a family with three young daughters could 
terminate its lease for an apartment when a Level Three sex 
offender moved next door. 
The case presented a novel question for the New York 
County Court and for the lease agreement itself 
While those who rent apartments are often confronted 
with disruptive or disagreeable neighbors, such a situation is 
not enough to permit a tenant to terminate the lease.2 
But when a sex offender moves next door, the notion of 
the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment takes on a whole new 
meaning. 
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